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This essay explores a particular methodology of comparative con-
stitutional analysis that it calls "constitutional listening." This method-
ology is presented as an alternative to the structural, best-practices
methodology that currently dominates comparative constitutional
discourse. Derived from the interpretive "principle of charity," consti-
tutional listening involves interpreting constitutional discourse of oth-
er polities in their best light. This includes not simply polities whose
constitutional structures and values resemble our own, but perhaps
even more importantly, polities and constitutional systems whose val-
ues and structures seem alien to us, either because they do not evince
the structural architectures we associate with constitutionalism, such
as judicial independence or multi-party electoral competition, or be-
cause they do not endorse the particular values we associate with con-
stitutionalism, such as political liberalism. The value of this
methodology, it is argued, lies in its ability to expand our understand-
ing of the diversity of experiences that have gone into the human pro-
ject of constitutionalism, and in the diversity of human possibilities
that the project provokes.
In Part I, I will explore problems with the current approach. We
will see that the current approach, which is derived from American
constitutional discourse, prevents us from looking for constitutional
possibilities that lie outside the conceptual reach of that discourse. In
Part II, I will develop an alternative methodology for comparative con-
stitutional analysis derived from the principle of charity. Finally in Part
III, I will demonstrate the comparative utility of that methodology in
exposing overlooked constitutional possibilities by "listening" to the
particular aspects of the constitutional discourse that was generated
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by China's draft property law, and in particular the critique of that law
published by Gong Xiantian,i that has been largely ignored by the dom-
inant political and legal academic communities of the North Atlantic
countries.
I. THE COGNITIVE LIMITS OF THE LIBERAL VISION
CONSTITUTIONALISM
In this section, I explore the limits of the liberal conceptualization
of constitutionalism. These limits manifest in at least two dimensions.
The first arises out of the defining emphasis of liberal constitutional-
ism on limiting and constraining state power. Many populations, par-
ticularly those in the more economically and culturally peripheral
countries of the "Global South" are not going to be particularly attract-
ed to such an agenda. The second arises out of a particular failure of
constitutional imagination that results from liberal constitutionalism's
definitional focus on particular, pre-defined institutional structures.
This results in what David Scuilli has presciently termed "the presup-
position of exhausted possibilities."2
A. The Metaphors ofAmerican Constitutionalism
The liberal vision of constitutionalism is constructed primarily out
of metaphors. These include a mechanical metaphor of power (e.g.,
power as a kind of thing)3; an anthropomorphic metaphor of institu-
tions (e.g., Congress intends, the electorate demands, the court deter-
mines);4 and an economic metaphor of political behavior (i.e., that
people's attitudes towards power are the same as their attitudes to-
wards money).s
Of course, the metaphors we live by are not arbitrarily assigned.
They direct attention to what are often situationally important aspects
of the phenomenon they describe. The liberal vision of constitutional-
ism arises primarily - perhaps even exclusively - out of Anglo-
American constitutional experience. The particular metaphors that are
1. Gong Xiantian, A Property Law (Draft) that Violates the Constitution and Basic Principles
of Socialism, in 29 LINKS: INT'L J. OF SOCIALIST RENEWAL (May-Aug., 2006).
2. DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF A NON-MARXIST
CRITICAL THEORY 9-11 (1st ed. 1992).
3. Steven L. Winter, The "Power" Thing, 82 VA. L. REV. 721, 745-46 (1996).
4. HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 168-71 (2009).
5. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 19-20 (1962).
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used to express that constitutionalism are very well adapted to making
sense out of that experience. The Anglo-American constitutional state
(that of seventeenth and eighteenth century England, and post-
seventeenth century United States) has never been seriously faced
with external threats to its existence. By the time both England and its
North American colonies started to explore for their own constitutions,
their principal society threats had long since become internal rather
than external. Such internal threats included political exploitation of
sectarian animosity leading to political usurpation during English Civil
War of the seventeenth century;6 growing taxation of private wealth
caused by governmental expansion;7 and the seemingly artificial politi-
cal entrenchment of an increasingly economically outdated landed
aristocracy, which diverted opportunities from the newly emerging
commercial class.8
The particular metaphors of liberal constitutionalism plainly focus
our attention on the ever-present possibilities of these internal kinds
of threats. The mechanical metaphor of power causes one to see the
dynamics of political influence in its most threatening light-that of
total loss of autonomy. The economic metaphor for political behavior
focuses attention on how the attributions of political office can work to
ensconce the political and social influence of its holder, as Cromwell
was infamously able to do in the aftermath of the English civil war. Our
anthropomorphic conception of institutions focuses attention on how
institutions can work to ensconce or attack particular class and/or
factional interests that threaten national cohesion and unity. This was
increasingly witnessed in post-Independence America after the unify-
ing force of English occupation (and appropriation) was removed.
Shays' Rebellion, the immediate trigger for the modern constitutional
reconstruction of the American state in 1787, caused reconstruction
that would serve as the principal reference point for the liberal vision
of constitutionalism and serves as a particularly dramatic reminder of
this.9
6. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7,
40-41 (1988).
7. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution
of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. EcON. HIST. 803, 811-
12 (1989).
8. See Gordon S. Wood, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 278-79 (1993).
9. MICHAEL LIENESCH, Reinterpreting Rebellion: The Influence of Shay's Rebellion on American
Political Thought, in IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN AGRARIAN REBELLION 161 (Robert A.




But these metaphors, and their particular emphases, are of much
more questionable suitability for polities whose perceived threats are
more external. Whereas American society functions acceptably well in
an environment in which power is constrained, a society faced with an
external threat will not be so concerned with constraining their own
power, but rather with constructing that power so as to repel the per-
ceived external threat. Such perceived external threats are not limited
to military threats. Economic threats, transnational political threats,
and even natural-environmental threats such as famine, epidemics,
and natural disasters, can all trigger a perceived demand for greater
state power rather than more-constrained state power. Even threats
emerging from within one's own borders, such as rampant crime, vio-
lence or poverty, can be perceived as "external" to the state to the ex-
tent they appear to be the products of non-state forces (such as
criminal gangs or lack of socio-economic modernization) rather than
abuses of existing state capacity. The more persistent these threats, the
less attractive the power-constraining emphasis of American constitu-
tional metaphors will be.
In fact, much of the world does indeed perceive itself as being
more persistently faced by external threats, and understandably so.
This is particularly true of the countries that are often referenced by
the term "the global south." Lacking innate wealth and disadvantaged
by their more peripheral relationship to the world's economic and
cultural cores, these countries are particularly susceptible to transna-
tional (external) economic, political and social forces.1o Examples of
such vulnerabilities include colonialism; being drawn into wars
brought on by the external political struggles between the Soviets and
the Americans; hardships resulting from forced imposition of particu-
lar domestic, economic and regulatory practices by international or-
ganizations such as the IMF and particular countries including the
United States (such as in the context of IP protection or "the war
against terror"); threats to domestic stability due to the innately skit-
tish nature of transnational (as contrasted with domestic) capital mar-
kets; and even vulnerability to large-scale campaigns mobilized by
transnational civil society. This is not to accuse the advanced industrial
nations of the North Atlantic of seeking to exploit or oppress peripher-
al countries. But the forces to which one feels vulnerable do not need
10. See Herman Schwartz, Dependency or Institutions? Economic Geography, Causal Mecha-




to be driven by human intentionality. Countries simply need to feel
constrained, intentionally or accidently. Furthermore, due to a lack of
wealth and lack of influence stemming from the lack of wealth, periph-
eral populations have understandable reasons for feeling externally
constrained.
Under such circumstances, visions of constitutionalism will corre-
spondingly tend to focus much more on state-building and not on
state-constraining. Of course, authoritarian regimes often take ad-
vantage of and manipulate such foci as a means of perpetuating their
power. And this leads many liberal comparativists to deny the reality
or "legitimacy" of these foci-dismissing them as mere creations of
authoritarian governments. In fact, state-building visions of constitu-
tionalism have a rich history even in the liberal polities of the North
Atlantic. Nevertheless, this is a history that has become invisible
among comparativists due to an increasing political domination of the
American liberal vision of constitutionalism and governance following
the Second World War. As noted above, this vision has served America
well, but in order to understand the full possibilities of constitutional-
ism as a human phenomenon, particularly as it manifests in the more
peripheral part of the world order, we must look beyond these Ameri-
can experiences.
B. The 'Presupposition of Exhausted Possibilities'
The other limitation in liberal constitutionalism lies in the fact
that it is not particularly conducive to what we might call "constitu-
tional learning." The idea of constitutional learning is founded on the
recognition that the human project of constitutionalism will always
contain possibilities that exceed our current constitutional imagina-
tion.1 The modern, liberal vision of constitutionalism tends to deny
this possibility by effectively assuming that we already know every-
thing we will ever need to know about the possibilities and impossibili-
ties of constitutionalism as a human endeavor. It does so by primarily
associating "constitutionalism" with a defining set of institutional
structures including electoral democracy, in which control of govern-
ment is determined by electoral competition between competing par-
ties; separation of powers, in which an "independent" judiciary is
11. Cf Sciulli, supra note 2, at 9-10 (discussing need for an understanding of constitutional-
ism that is not bound by the fallacy of exhausted possibilities).
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critical; and the rule of law, in particular, the constraining of public
governance by law as enforced by an independent judiciary.12
Such features are means to an end, not ends themselves. For ex-
ample, despite our constitutional reverence for electoral supervision,
we generally reject subjecting judges to electoral appointment because
we feel that although electoral supervision contributes to executive
and congressional performance, it does not improve judicial perfor-
mance. Democratic elections are not an unqualified constitutional
good, rather they are a good only insofar as they contribute to some
higher constitutional good-representative responsiveness, political
accountability and smooth transfers of power. Where such higher
goods are not at issue, democratic election is similarly not at issue.
Likewise, our attraction to the rule of law does not prevent us from
removing large swaths of governmental activity from the purview of
judicial review, again because the good of judicial review is derivative
from its ability to promote higher goods, and where it does not seem to
do so (such as when second guessing the expertise or even the ration-
ality of other governmental actors), there is little moral demand for it.
In short, it is the ends achieved by these structural features, rather
than their simple being, that recommends them to our constitutional
attention. But a structural definition of constitutionalism hides this
means-ends relationship by effectively conflating means with ends.
This, in turn, prevents us from searching for possibilities that might
provide alternatives, and perhaps even superior, ways to bring about
these ends-ways that have not yet revealed themselves to our pre-
sent constitutional understanding. For example, to say that constitu-
tionalism is denotatively identified by the presence of some aspect of
separation of powers leaves us no conceptual purchase for critical re-
flection into the possibility that perhaps, in some particular environ-
ments and under particular circumstances, there may actually exist
other ways of achieving the particular ends that separation of powers
is intended to bring about. Moreover, that in at least some of these
particular environments or circumstances, these alternative means
may represent as yet unidentified improvements to the more tradi-
tional separation of powers response.13
12. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic
Defects, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 39
(Michael Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
13. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267, 389, 401 (1998). See also Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving
Courts: From Innovation to Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003).
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David Sciulli has compellingly coined this particular debilitation in
American constitutional thought "the presupposition of exhausted
possibilities."14 Basically, identifying constitutionalism with a simple
laundry-list of structural features effectively asserts that these struc-
tural features represent the only possible way of achieving their as-
signed constitutional ends. Thereby effectively asserting that we
already know everything there is to know about the human possibili-
ties of constitutionalism. Therefore, there is nothing left for us to learn.
In the famous (or perhaps infamous) phraseology of Francis Fukuya-
ma, we have achieved "the end of history"is insofar as human constitu-
tionalism is concerned.
II. TAKING IDEAS SERIOUSLY: CONSTITUTIONAL LISTENING
A. Of 'Ideas,' 'Charity,' and 'Learning'
In sum, the dominant liberal vision of constitutionalism works
very well in what we might call 'familiar' constitutional contexts-
those in which the state is strong, stable and modern. Here a metaphor
of limiting state power is useful, and the structures, which we use to
identify constitutionalism, do indeed serve this limiting purpose, which
is all we require of them anyway. The problem arises when we move
outside the comfort of the familiar and into contexts in which the state
is not suitably strong. In these cases, the liberal constitutional meta-
phors are of less resonance because the relevant issue includes the
construction of state power, and not solely its limitation. In such cir-
cumstances, the structural focus of the liberal vision becomes positive-
ly dysfunctional. The only way we can come to understand the
dynamics of constitutionalism in these environments is to learn new
forms of constitutionalism. The structural vision prevents us from do-
ing that.
Understanding the unfamiliar demands a process of learning, not
simply one of evaluating. In this section, I will explore what such a pro-
cess of constitutional learning entails.
1. Ideas
I start with a story:
14. Sciulli, supra note 2, at 9-10.
15. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 64 (1992).
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Entering the 1950s, Poland was effectively a vassal of the Soviet
Union. In 1952, the Soviets had imposed on Poland a constitution that
was actually quite impressive from a liberal perspective. But of course,
this constitution was "a fiction in nearly every respect, and the authori-
ty treated it essentially as propaganda for foreign consumption."16 It
bore no resemblance to how government actually operated.17
The death of Stalin and a slight easing of Soviet control be-
queathed a certain bit of autonomy to the Polish state, and one of its
first acts was to amend the 1952 Constitution to bring it closer in line
with reality:
Surprisingly perhaps... the constitutions of Eastern Europe became
somewhat less liberal as the Stalinist terror relaxed. The 'leading
role' of the communist parties was written into these documents, as
was the special role of the Soviet Union in the countries' affairs. The
litany of unenforceable social and economic rights expanded with
time, while American-style political rights were scaled down.18
Paradoxically, the act of implementing a more realistic and more
expressly authoritarian constitution triggered a countervailing liberal-
ization and constitutionalization of Poland's actual political environ-
ment. As explained by Andrzej Rapaczynski:
In a somewhat perverse way... the reforms reflected a movement
toward the rule of law ... [A]t least in Poland and Hungary, the lead-
ership also tried to present a certain faqade of legitimacy to the pop-
ulation at large. The regime made clear that it would tolerate no
fundamental assaults on its core powers, but it permitted a certain
amount of freedom at the margin. Therefore, the regimes returned in
part to legality: at the very least a paper record was left of official ac-
tion, and the increased publicity deterred most instances of the
purely personal exercise of power by the lower echelons of the Party
and the state bureaucracy.
To implement such a system, however, legal norms had to become
somewhat more realistic; they had to give the leadership the right to
suppress opposition to the fundamental principles on which com-
munist authority was based, and with time these changes had to
reach the constitutional level. The amendments concerning the 'lead-
ing role' of the Communist party, for example, removed most legal
grounds from the potential political claims of the opposition. Simi-
larly, the codification of the dominant position of the Soviet Union
and the unassailable status of the Warsaw pact expressed a formal
limitation on Eastern European countries' sovereignty, and thus
marked a relatively clear boundary (set by the Brezhnev Doctrine) of
16. Andrzej Rapaczynski, Constitutional Politics in Poland: A Report on the Constitutional
Committee of the Polish Parliament, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 595, 597 (1991).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 596-97.
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all possible internal reforms. At the same time, however, these
changes signified that constitutions were beginning to mean some-
thing. In Poland the government even took some steps to introduce a
watered-down version of judicial review.19
This dynamic has also been well described in other literatures. For
instance, Jon Elster has termed it "the civilizing force of hypocrisy," and
he explains it as the product of the fact that political effectiveness ulti-
mately depends at some level on keeping one's word.2o Writing some
hundred and fifty years earlier, Alexis de Tocqueville identified a simi-
lar dynamic, what Mark Barenberg has more recently termed "runa-
way legitimation," which drove the progression of the French Revolu-
Revolution.21
The setting of this story introduces us to an important corrective
to the liberal-structural vision. This is the recognition, obscured by the
liberal-structural emphasis on structure, that "ideas matter."22 In other
words, it is the recognition that ideas can constrain independent of any
particular structural design.23 Ideas can constrain cognition by subject-
ing the definition of power to the constantly churning evolutions of
social meaning.24 Since the construction of social meaning is an innate-
ly spontaneous phenomenon, it makes "ideas" a good candidate for
that non-structural motor for spontaneous constitutional evolution
that we are searching for here.
Indeed, the recognition that ideas matter actually played a germi-
nal role in the invention of modern constitutionalism. As I have de-
scribed elsewhere, the modern, post-Aristotelian understanding of
constitutionalism in part grew out of a new kind of political epistemol-
ogy brought about by the Enlightenment.25 This was an epistemology
19. Id. at 597-98.
20. JON ELSTER, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 111
(Jon Elster ed., 1998).
21. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE REVOLUTION (Frangois Furet & Franoise
M&lonio eds., Alan S. Kahan trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998) (1856); Mark Barenberg, Democ-
racy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Produc-
tion, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 833-34 (1994).
22. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VoL. 1: REASON AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 279-95 (Thomas McCarthy trans.) (1981).
2 3. Id.
24. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 962 (1995).
25. See, e.g., THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, at xlix (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold
Samuel Stone eds. and trans., 1989) (1748):
It is not a matter of indifference that the people be enlightened. The prejudices of magistrates
began as the prejudices of magistrates began as the prejudices of the nation. In a time of igno-
rance, one has no doubts even while doing the greatest evils; in an enlightened age, one trembles
even while doing the greatest goods. One feels the old abuses and sees their correction, but one
also sees the abuses of the correction itself. One lets an ill remain if one fears something worse;
1232012]
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that saw political knowledge and understanding as residing in univer-
sal reasons that were cognitively accessible to all persons, as contrast-
ed against an earlier epistemology that saw capacity for political
understanding as being limited to a particular class of the population.26
In his germinal analysis of the French Revolution mentioned above,
Tocqueville identified this new political epistemology, this new way of
constructing political ideas, as the spontaneous motor that drove the
revolution unprecedentedly, and in his mind, beyond the reach of hu-
man intentionality.27 Modern constitutionalism arose as a regulatory
response to this new phenomenon, and its new way of envisioning
political authority.28
And it was its 'Enlightened' epistemic character, not its liberal as-
pects, which caused this new modern notion of constitutionalism to
spread outside of the Anglo-European realm. When Japan and the Ot-
toman Empire became the first non-European countries to import this
previously European notion of a "constitution" into their own concep-
tualization of politics, they did not do so out of an ideological embrace
of liberalism, but out of an embrace of modernism.29 Such modernism
carried with it a distinct epistemic character, an embrace of rational
openness. In Europe, this embrace is most identified with the Enlight-
one lets a good remain if one is in doubt about a better. One looks at the parts only in order to
judge the whole; one examines all the causes in order to see the results.
If I could make it so that everyone had new reasons for loving his duties, his prince, his homeland
and his laws and that each could better feel his happiness in his own country, government, and
position, I would consider myself the happiest of mortals.
See also Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 20 (Ernest O'Dell ed., 2010) (1777-1778):
AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficiency of the subsisting federal government, you
are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject
speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of
the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in
many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to
have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good gov-
ernment from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their
political constitutions on accident and force.
26. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY
INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 14-26 (Thomas Burger trans., 1992). Cf PETER GAY, THE
ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION VOL II: THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM 398-99 (1969).
27. See Tocqueville, supra note 21. See also LYNN HUNT, POLITICS, CULTURE, AND CLASS IN THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (1984).
28. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1977). See also Michael A. Wilkinson, Between
Freedom and Law: Hannah Arendt on the Promise of Modern Revolution and the Burden of 'The
Tradition', in HANNAH ARENDT AND THE LAW 35 (Marco Goldoni & Christopher McCorkindale eds.,
2012).
29. See ROBERT DEVEREUX, THE FIRST OTTOMAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD: A STUDY OF THE MIDHAT
CONSTITUTION AND PARLIAMENT (1963); GEORGE AKITA, FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
IN MODERN JAPAN, 1868-1900 (1967).
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enment. Moreover, it is therefore telling that in Japan, the import of
European constitutionalism corresponded with a larger social-
epistemic movement known as the "Meiji Enlightenment," while in the
Ottoman Empire, it corresponded with a transitional movement known
as the "Tanzimat Enlightenment" (or "Ottoman Enlightenment").3o In
both these cases, the term "Enlightenment" refers to an "Enlightened"
new epistemic embrace of rationality and reasoned discourse, not to
any political embrace of liberal values.31
Therefore, an ideational definition of constitutionalism is more in-
clusive of the historical antecedents and determinants of modern con-
stitutionalism when it locates constitutionalism in efforts to
accommodate more open political epistemologies. It is more inclusive
both insofar as "Western" Euro-American experiences are concerned
and insofar as the appeal of constitutionalism outside of the Euro-
American West is concerned, than the liberal vision that tends to dom-
inate comparative constitutional discourse at least in the Anglo-
American world. It is from there, rather than from liberalism, that an
investigation into a possible "constitutional learning" might most
promisingly proceed.
In claiming that ideas matter, it needs to be emphasized that what
matters is the idea as an epistemic phenomenon and not as a bearer of
some particular content.32 The ideas that matter can be liberal, but
they do not need to be-they can just as well be non-liberal or even
anti-liberal, as the above example of Poland in the 1950s demon-
strates.33 They can be fictitious, as was that of the "Norman Yoke" in
English constitutional history34 if not blatantly and unapologetically
false.35 What matters is the idea's capacity to shape the construction of
cognition.
30. See Devereux, supra note 29; Akita, supra note 29.
31. See Devereux, supra note 29; Akita, supra note 29.
32. HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 67 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1960). Compare PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1967) with STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1995).
33. Rapaczynski, supra note 16, at 596-97.
34. Richard T. Vann, The Free Anglo-Saxons: A Historical Myth, 19 J. OF THE HIST. OF IDEAS 259,
259 (1958).
35. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, VALERIE BRAITHWAITE, MICHAEL COOKSON & LEAH DUNN, ANOMIE




As described above, our interest in constitutional ideas stems
from an interest in their social meaning, not from an interest in their
external veracity. The best heuristic for determining the meaning that
a society attaches to a particular idea is simply to listen to how a
speaker from that society uses those ideas, and interpret his or her
words in their most reasonable light-i.e., to interpret them under the
presumption that the speaker is rational in the Aristotelian sense of
the word.36 This is Donald Davidson's celebrated "principle of chari-
ty."37 I am proposing a "constitutional" principle of charity in the ser-
vice of constitutional learning.38 The principle of charity argues, inter
alia, that our best approach for interpreting a speaker's statement is to
initially privilege possible interpretations that maximize the coherence
or rationality in the subject's sayings. This works to maximize the
amount of information-including both empirical information and
what we might call 'insight'-that flows from the subject to the inter-
preter. As Davidson said, "[such charity] is forced on us; whether we
like it or not, if we want to understand others."39 This, of course, is
exactly what we are seeking to achieve in the context of constitutional
learning: an understanding of unfamiliar constitutional systems and
experiences.
An assertion that the key to understanding unfamiliar constitu-
tional systems lies in simply listening to what these systems have to
say about themselves will strike many as a rather pedestrian observa-
tion. As Davidson said, this is our default mode for understanding the
other,4o and in this sense I seem to advocate simply what we would
otherwise do. Yet surprisingly, in the context of comparative constitu-
tional law, we almost never pay attention to what an unfamiliar consti-
tutional system says about itself-or more precisely, what the full
membership of that system says when they speak to one another. At
best, we privilege a few selected voices, voices who have been selected
because they seem to resonate with some external ideology like the
36. See DONALD DAVIDSON, INQUIRIES INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION xvii (1984) (the principle
of charity was first identified by Neil L. Wilson in 1959). See also Neil L. Wilson, Substances with-
out Substrata, 12 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 521, 532 (1959).
37. Davidson, supra note 36.
38. Michael W. Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of Constitutional
Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 84-87 (2002-2003) (for more
detailed development of this idea).




American liberal vision, or the discourse of international human rights
law, or even the neo-liberal economic constitutionalism of mainstream
developmental economics.
For example, many Euro-American scholars looking at constitu-
tionalism in China will indeed listen charitably to the American-
inspired ideas that Chinese constitutionalism articulated by the liberal
Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo. But they have no interest in finding char-
itable interpretation of the constitutional articulations of Mao Zedong.
In fact, there is a dominant presumption among these scholars that
charitable interpretations of Mao are impossible.41 This presumption
exists, despite the fact that at least some of Mao's constitutional 'ideas'
do indeed resonate with a significant portion of the Chinese popula-
tion. This includes not simply the party elite, but also significant por-
tions of the ordinary population, who not infrequently use Maoist ideas
to actually challenge that elite.42 Clearly, there is going to be a funda-
mental lack of understanding when an outside observer presumptively
dismisses as constitutionally "meaningless" a particular set of ideas
that in fact convey important, affirmative and influential constitutional
understandings to many in that population. However, this is exactly
what we dO.43 A constitutional principle of charity requires us to listen
charitably not simply to the ideas of Liu Xiaobo and likeminded Chi-
nese liberals, but also to those conveyed in the many non-liberal voices
(e.g., Maoist, Marxist, Confucianism) that participate and carry signifi-
cant meaning in China's budding popular-constitutional imagination.44
Of course, the objection to my complaint here is that Mao really
was a "bad man" because he was driven by power and personal ag-
grandizement and did not have a genuine interest in promoting any-
thing remotely resembling constitutionalism, that is
"constitutionalism" in the sense of some epistemically-open (and hence
contestable) vision of the role and responsibilities of the Chinese state
41. See DANIEL F. VUKOVICH, CHINA AND ORIENTALISM: WESTERN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND THE
P.R.C 47-65 (2012). See, e.g., Perry Link, An Abnormal Mind, THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, July
22, 2005, at 22.
42. See generally MOBo GAO, THE BATTLE FOR CHINA'S PAST: MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
(2008). See also Ching Kwan Lee, What Was Socialism to Chinese Workers? Collective Memories and
Labor Politics in an Age of Reform, in RE-ENVISIONING THE CHINESE REVOLUTION: THE POLITICS AND
POETICS OF COLLECTIVE MEMORIES IN REFORM CHINA 141 (Ching Kwan Lee & Guobin Yang eds., 2007).
43. Vukovich,supra note 41.
44. See Michael W. Dawdle, Popular Constitutionalism and the Constitutional Meaning of
Charter 08, in Liu XIAOBO, CHARTER 08 AND THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA 205, 227




and those who claim to represent that state.4s But from our discussion
above, we can see that this objection is actually irrelevant. Our interest
is not in the political psychology of Mao Zedong; our interest is not in
Chinese political history; our interest is not in the moral quality of Mao
the man. Rather, our interest is simply in the social-constitutional
meanings that attach to particular ideas that are attributed to Mao.
Whether these meanings actually correspond to his own personal mo-
tivations, intentions or actions is irrelevant.
During most of the 1890s, French politics were dominated by the
French Military's abusive persecution of Alfred Dreyfus on charges of
espionage.46 Dreyfus was Jewish, and many attributed this persecution
to anti-Semitism.47 Therefore, the constitutional meaning that ulti-
mately attached to I'affaire Dreyfus was that the French State needed to
sever itself from all religious affiliations, in particular with the Catholic
Church, resulting in the still-meaningful constitutional doctrine known
as laicitd (laicity).48 In fact, the French Military's persecution of Captain
Dreyfus was not significantly driven by any State-sponsored anti-
Semitism, and the Catholic Church itself actually condemned France's
treatment of Captain DreyfuS.49 Rather, the persecution was driven by
the Military's political dependency on particular conservative and Roy-
alist elements of French civil society, elements over which particular
groups that were both conservative and anti-Semitic held special
sway.so In other words, the Dreyfus Affair had nothing to do with the
constitutional lessons that were and still are drawn from that affair.
However, this does not diminish in the least the constitutional import
of these lessons, and their import to our own understanding of and
appreciation for the distinctive secularity of French constitutional-
ism.51
The fact of the matter is that over the long term, the actual inten-
tion of the speaker does not really matter in determining the effect of
the speech. It is the interpretation of the listener, not the speaker,
45. See, e.g., Link, supra note 41.
46. See generally MICHAEL BURNS, DREYFUS: A FAMILY AFFAIR, 1789-1945 (1991); GEORGE R.
WHYTE, THE DREYFUS AFFAIR: A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY (2005).
47. Burns, supra note 46, at xiii.
48. Whyte, supra note 46, at 311.
49. Burns, supra note 46, at 318.
50. Id. at 289-90.
51. Id. at 329.
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which determines the meanings that attach to ideas.52 Regardless of
what Mao actually thought, it is not hard to find empathy with his con-
sistent appeal to liberation from class-based oppressions and oppres-
sions resulting from economic and industrial disparities, even if,
arguendo, he himself personally did not act in accord with such beliefs.
People who sympathetically appeal to Mao are not appealing to his
alleged hypocrisy-to do so would be self-defeating of their own ar-
gument. They are appealing to the positive meaning they see Mao's
ideas as expressing. We do not and should not deny the constitutional
importance that Americans attach to what they call "Jeffersonian de-
mocracy," simply because its founder and namesake, Thomas Jefferson,
willfully violated its principles by owning slaves.53 The constitutional
import of a human desire to be politically and economically equal, re-
gardless of circumstance or birth or location in a particular industrial
class, is equally meaningful regardless of whether it is expressed by or
attributed to a modern day human-rights activist, an eighteenth centu-
ry slave-owning liberal, or even a populist demagogue in mid twentieth
century China.
Some might further seek to contest this by pointing out that popu-
lar constitutional discourse in China is heavily censored, and that the
fact of such censorship corrupts that actual social meaning that attach-
es to Mao's ideas. But this requires us to examine the actual social ef-
fects of censorship.
Censorship can have two kinds of foci. One is censoring facts. The
other is censoring competing interpretations of particular facts. Insofar
as a principle of charity is concerned, censorship of facts need not con-
cern us. The principle of charity does not require us to accept a speak-
er's factual claims as true, it merely requires us to proceed from a
starting presumption that the speaker believes his or her factual claims
to be true. This is because the principle of charity is a device for under-
standing social interpretations of reality, not reality per se.
Therefore, if censorship does pose a threat to the efficacy of the
principle of charity, it does so by censoring opposing constructions of
social reality, not opposing claims of actual reality. But the presence of
oppositional constructions of some social reality does not diminish the
range of useful interpretative meanings that reside within some par-
52. See Elster, supra note 20, at 109-12 (The innate epistemic disconnection between the
intent of the speaker and the meaning of her speech is well captured by Jon Elster in his explora-
tion of "the civilizing force of hypocrisy.").




ticular construction of that reality. The orthodox Christian theology of
the Catholic Church ca. the fifth through thirteenth centuries CE was
highly contestable, and was also fiercely protected from competing
interpretations by considerable censorship.54 Nevertheless, it was able
to produce a range of still useful interpretations of social reality, in-
cluding the social reality of law, as evinced by the continuing import of
the ideas of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.ss
The fact is that even under conditions of heavy censorship, even
the most privileged statement conforms to a society's prior and deeper
understandings of the nature of its world and the values these under-
standings provoke if it is to have any desired social effect. The speaker
will know this. The speaker's appeals will therefore, at the very least,
reflect his or her own understanding of what listeners ultimately be-
lieve.56 They are not strategic constructions of belief, because belief
cannot be dictated by fiat. For this reason, the presence of censorship
does not in fact compromise the particular utility of the principle of
charity, which is to identify possible understandings, not to identify
object truths.
Finally, we might also note that we can further counteract the af-
fects of censorship by focusing on discourse and not on individual
statements. We will explore this further when we look at the issue of
identifying interpretive coherence.
B. Taking Ideas Seriously: Searching for Coherence
As described above, constitutionalism is ultimately about a partic-
ular kind of social epistemic construct that we are calling "ideas."
Moreover, we need not demand that these ideas express some particu-
lar content-we need not demand that they be "liberal"-because their
ultimate constitutional import lies in their ability to simply constrain
our political cognition (i.e. to constrain what can be imagined within
that particular constitutional polity). The key to comparative constitu-
tional understanding, therefore, lies in our ability to empathize with
these ideas, to understand how they can be real and not simply to dis-
miss them presumptively as delusional, even when at first blush, they
54. See CHARLES FREEMAN, THE CLOSING OF THE WESTERN MIND: THE RISE OF FAITH AND THE FALL OF
REASON 294 (2002).
55. See generally AUGUSTINE AND MODERN LAW (Richard 0. Brooks & James Bernard Murphy
eds., 2011); CHARLES P. NEMETH, AQUINAS IN THE COURTROOM: LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT
183 (2001).
56. See Elster, supra note 20, at 109-12. See generally Dowdle, supra note 38.
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seem to contradict our own honestly-held ideas about what comprises
the constitutional. This is the lesson of the principle of charity.
In this section, I will explore in more detail how one might go
about adapting the principle of charity to constitutional discourse. I
will call this particular adaptation, "constitutional listening." As de-
rived from the principle of charity, constitutional listening involves
finding the most coherent interpretations we can for constitutional
discourse emanating from a foreign system, so that we may use the
insights they embody to interrogate and add to our own understand-
ings. Such a practice requires us to confront three particular conceptu-
al issues. These include: (1) what constitutes "coherence"; (2) what
constitutes "discourse"; and (3) what constitutes the "constitutional"?
I already began exploring the issue of coherence above when I exam-
ined what comprises the constitutional. I will further examine each
inquiry in turn.
1. Of Coherence, Culture and the Presumption of a Universal Truth
The idea of constitutional listening presumes that communication
across legal systems is possible. Some comparative legal scholars,
however, are skeptical that "interpretations" can meaningfully inform
one another across cultures.57
There are two responses to this kind of skepticism. The first is
methodological. Quite simply, it is true that we can never really know if
we accurately understand another culture, or even another individual.
As Davidson himself so well described, our efforts to understand any-
one, cross-cultural or intra-cultural, are ultimately heuristic: at the end
of the day, they can only be founded on a presumption of a possibility of
understanding.58 However, in this sense, the skeptic claiming cultural
incompatibility is on no firmer empirical ground than one claiming the
possibility of understanding. We have no greater reason for presuming
that some otherwise apparent understanding is unfounded, simply
because it occurs across cultures, than we do for presuming that our
own apparent understanding is accurate.
In fact, just the opposite is true. There is good reason to privilege
the possibility of understanding over skepticism. Meta-studies of cul-
tural psychology consistently find that both perceptions of experience
and modes of making sense of those perceptions (e.g., rationalism, sen-
57. See, e.g., REBECCA R. FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET 57-
59 (1995).
58. Davidson, supra note 36, at 197.
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timentalism, folk knowledge) in fact do not differ significantly across
cultures: both perception and cognition (reason) are human and not
cultural phenomena.s What differs among cultures is the way percep-
tion and cognition is expressed and not differences in perception or
cognition per se.60 Interpretation and understanding occur when we
understand how a particular perception or cognition, which we all
generally share in common, is contextualized by the particular set of
symbols and metaphors another culture uses to describe that percep-
tion or cognition.61 Since patterns of perception and cognition are not
culture specific, we can safely assume congruence between ourselves
and our speaker in these domainS.62 As noted above, the idea of consti-
tutional listening recommends itself to us precisely because it seems to
promote our capacities to overcome the conceptual limitations that
our cultural metaphors impose upon us, and because it allows us to
recognize the diversity of possible insights that are highlighted by the
diversity of other cultures' metaphors.
2. The Threat of Conventionalism
A second objection to the principle of charity is that it threatens to
conflate "truth" with simple agreement.63 If we are looking for inter-
pretations that already make sense to us, then it is sometimes argued
that we are in fact only looking for interpretations that we already
agree with. If this is the case, the principle of charity might help us nib-
ble at the edges of the limits of our cultural understandings, but it
would not induce the more transformative forms of learning claimed of
it. Indeed, by pretending to be epistemically open when it is not, it
could serve to reinforce perceptual biases induced by cultural ways of
talking. For instance, by creating a tautological psychological dynamic
of "she agrees with me (because my charitable interpretative method-
59. See DIANNE VAN HEMERT, PATTERNS OF CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN PSYCHOLOGY: A META-
ANALYTIC APPROACH 132-33, 136-37 (2003). See also STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN
DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 42 (2002).
60. Cf Van Hemert, supra note 59, at 136-37.
61. Cf GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 200-01 (1980).
62. Id. at 194.
63. I thank Leigh Jenco for bringing this objection to my attention (albeit while also empha-
sizing that she does not actually endorse this claim). This objection is also raised in Chad Hansen,
Fa (Standards: Laws) and Meaning Changes in Chinese Philosophy, 44 PHIL. E. AND W. 435, 438-39
(1994). One solution to this problem is found in a revised version of the principle of charity called
"the principle of humanity." See Richard Grandy, Reference Meaning and Belief 70 J. OF PHIL. 439,
445 (1973). However, for reasons discussed below, I argue that despite this, the principle of




ology conditions me to interpret her states in ways I find agreeable),
and therefore I must be right (because, after all, my charitable inter-
pretation shows that she shares my worldview)."
As an initial response, we might point out that claiming that we
cannot distinguish conceptual coherence from agreement is clearly
false. We all have experience disagreeing with people whose intelli-
gence we respect and find coherent. Indeed, such disagreement often
produces in us a distinct agitation. This agitation, I would argue, is a
product of the cognitive dissonance that results when clearly reasona-
ble people do not agree with our reasoning, a cognitive dissonance that
in turn causes us to question our own reasoning. (For similar reasons,
we also feel agitation when we find ourselves unable to accomplish
some task that we believe we should be able to accomplish.) We do not
feel such agitation, however, when we find ourselves in disagreement
with a three-year old, or with someone for whose intellect we have
little regard, like someone who is clearly drunk, for example. Such feel-
ings of agitation in the face of certain kinds of disagreement indicate
that we are in fact able to distinguish between agreement and coher-
ence.
The objection of conventionalism goes even deeper than this. It
might acknowledge that we can distinguish agreement from coherence
at the margins. But it could still assert that we cannot distinguish disa-
greement from coherence insofar as our larger cultural patterns of
perception (i.e., meanings) are concerned. In other words, convention-
alism can help us see how new experiences might fit into existing pat-
terns of experience, but it cannot help us perceive new patterns of
meaning per se. This is because pattern recognition itself represents a
kind of bias. It is well recognized, for example, that humans are predis-
posed to find patterns in phenomenon in which no such patterns actu-
ally exist. A good example of this is found in traders in the New York
Stock Exchange. Studies have consistently found that it is impossible to
outperform the market in that Exchange simply by studying price
movements (i.e., that there are no patterns to the price movements on
that exchange).64 Yet traders routinely believe that they can perceive
subtle patterns in market pricing that, if properly pursued, would al-
low them to outperform the market as a whole.65 To extrapolate to the
64. See Meir Statman, Behavioral Finance: Past Battles and Future Engagements, 55 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 18, 20 (1999).
65. Cf Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology and
Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. OF FIN. 1839, 1866 (1998).
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principle of charity, it would mean that we have a bias towards seeing
meanings (i.e., cognitive patterns) that we are familiar with in external
constitutional phenomenon, even when those meanings do not in fact
exist. Accordingly this bias compromises the actual interpretive impli-
cations of a finding of coherence.
While pattern bias may not be perceived in individual evaluations
of coherence, it can be perceived in the aggregate, by looking for pat-
terns of coherence across a field of events rather than simply within a
singular event. This is exactly how the pattern recognition biases that
tend to infect trading on the New York Stock Exchange were identi-
fied.66 Clearly, traders can and sometimes do outperform the market in
individual transactions; they can and do sometimes outperform the
market over short-term timelines. At these levels, their bias cannot be
perceived. The bias becomes apparent, however, when we look at the
aggregate of trades over the long term. This perspective allows us to
see that while individuals do sometimes outperform the market, these
incidents of outperformance are no different in pattern than what we
would expect to find in a market that is completely random.67
However, in this sense, the objection from conventionalism does
offer an important correlate to the principle of charity. This is that our
charitable search for coherence needs to be a field-wide search and not
simply a search that focuses on individual interpretations operating in
isolation.68 It recommends, in other words, that we listen for meaning,
not so much by focusing on individual statements, but by listening to
entire conversations (i.e., in discourse).
C Focusing on Discourse
The questions of "what constitutes coherence?" and "what consti-
tutes discourse?" are related. We saw that to take better account of our
own limited rationalities created by our received conceptual frame-
works, we need to interpret foreign constitutional statements against
their larger discursive background. We might call this background the
"discursive space" in which the statement is located. A discursive space
is defined basically by the collective communicative behavior of both
the speaker and the intended audience. Coherence is evinced not simp-
66. Werner F. M. De Bondt, Stock Prices: Insights from Behavioral Finance, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 64, 64 (Alan Lewis ed., 2008).
67. Id. at 76.
68. I develop this idea further in Dowdle, supra note 44, at 206.
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ly in the statements of the speaker, but more robustly in how the
speaker and the audience seem to be responding to one another.
Note that responding in this sense is different from simply react-
ing. By responding, I mean that communicative patterns must be evolv-
ing, not static. If Speaker A says "X is true"; and Speaker B replies "X is
false"; and Speaker A comes back with "yes it is"; to which Speaker B
retorts "no it isn't," ad infinitum, this would not represent responsive
communication. To be responsive, Speaker A's and Speaker B's state-
ments must evolve in response to each other. Such responsiveness
indicates that the speakers are themselves perceiving coherence in
each other's speech. By following the coherence, not simply of the sin-
gle statement, but also of responses to that statement, we can check
whether our own interpretations-and the kinds of responses they
might generate-are indeed accurately channeling the meaning of the
statement.
Consider, along these lines, the Chinese party-state's use of the
term "socialist" in the context of China's constitutionalism. It has long
claimed that China's constitutional system was not only distinctly "
socialist," but distinctly "Chinese socialist."69 Interestingly, China's
party-state has also patently refused to discuss or describe what such
socialism means. Traditionally, it has actively suppressed societal ef-
forts to search for the meaning of concept.70 In this sense, there has
been no responsive evolution of the party-state's discourse on socialist
constitutionalism. And for this reason, as I have argued elsewhere, the
Chinese party-state's idea of "socialist constitutionalism" would indeed
appear to be a conception that in fact lacks meaningful coherence, de-
spite the large number of statements in which it is used.71
On the other hand, let us consider the China party-state's use of
the term "democracy." China's party-state claims to be a democracy.72
Observers working from Anglo-American perspectives in particular
dismiss this claim as incoherent, since China's political system is cer-
tainly not "democratic" in the way that the Anglo-American perspec-
tive of constitutionalism defines the term.73 But Anglo-American
69. See, e.g., Randall Peerenboom, Social Foundations of China's Living Constitution, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 138, 155-61 (Tom Ginsburg ed., 2012).
70. See Michael Dowdle, Of 'socialism' and 'socialist' legal transformations in China and Vi-
etnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM & LEGAL CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE REFORM 21, 36-
37 (John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson eds., 2005).
71. ld.at35-37.
72. See, e.g., XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], Dec. 4, 1982, Preamble, arts. 1-3 (China).
73. See, e.g., John L. Thornton, Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China, 87
FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2008).
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constitutionalism has a strong structural emphasis-that in this case
tends to conflate "democracy" with multi-party elections for national
public office74 -and one of the main goals of constitutional listening is
to help us escape the conceptual limits that this emphasis subjects us
to. With regard to China's own constitutional-political system, there is
clearly conceptual and discursive evolution with regard to its discus-
sions of "democracy." In particular, the claim is clearly associated with
evolutions in parliamentary processes,7s village governance,76 access
to governmental information,77 and industrial relations.78 Most im-
portantly, surveys suggest that the party-state's usage of these terms
does indeed resonate with the general population, and that the popula-
tion has incorporated state visions of democracy into their own dis-
cOurse.79
All of this suggests a coherence to China's usage, albeit one that
the more traditional constitutional metaphors for democracy-namely
electoral appointment to high public office-perhaps works to ob-
scure. In fact, even in American constitutionalism, there is an alterna-
tive vision of democracy that focuses on democracy as participation
(i.e., "deliberative democracy") rather than democracy as simply vote-
casting. Indeed, a number of prominent scholars of Anglo-American
law and politics, working out of this "deliberative democracy" tradi-
tion, have occasionally pointed to particular aspects of China's ongoing
exploration of "democracy" to help expand our own understanding of
what democracy itself could entail.8o
74. See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD COUNTRY RATING 1972-2007 at 9-10
(2008).
75. See, e.g., Dowdle, supra note 38, at 174-79.
76. See, e.g., Kevin J. O'Brien, Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China, 27
MODERN CHINA 407, 425 (2001).
77. See generally Jamie P. Horsley, Toward a More Open China, in THE RIGHT To KNOW:
TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 54-91 (Ann Florini ed., 2007).
78. See, e.g., TIANJIAN SHI, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN BEIJING 152-63 (1997).
79. See Lu Chunlong, Democratic Values among Chinese People: Analysis of a public opinion
survey, 55 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 2, 6 (2004); Tianjian Shi, China: Democratic Values Supporting an
Authoritarian System, in How EAST ASIANS VIEW DEMOCRACY 209, 212-18 (Yun-han Chu, Larry
Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan & Doh Chull Shin eds., 2008).
80. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE
105-11 (1998); James S. Fishkin, Baogang He, Robert C. Luskin & Alice Siu, Deliberative Democracy
in an Unlikely Place: Deliberative Polling in China, 40 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2010); Owen Fiss, Two
Constitutions, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 492, 500-02 (1986). Note that it is not an objection to a finding of
possible coherence to note that some people within that discursive disagree with the interpreta-
tion. The focus on discourse is a search for responsive interaction, not agreement. Many within
China would indeed contest China's official claim to be practicing and promoting democracy. But
this by itself does not deny the possibility that that claim is nevertheless coherent. It could be that
the disagreement stems from a disagreement over issues of fact; it could be that it stems from
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D. Identifying the Constitutional
This of course brings us to the question of "what is 'constitution-
al"'? Can we, as outside observers, simply attach the label of "constitu-
tional" to any behavior that fits our fancy, without regard to whether
the discursive space itself actually perceives its discourse as being con-
stitutional in nature? But if not, what is it that distinguishes a discourse
as being constitutional in character?81
As an initial response, we might recall the discussion above that
since constitutional listening is concerned with listening to others'
discourses with a view to promoting our own understanding of human
potential, the lack of an explicit constitutional intentionality among
speakers or their audiences is not directly relevant to our purpose. In
advancing its particular interpretation of the written 1787 Constitu-
tion, the Federalist Papers gave constitutional meaning to a wide varie-
ty of historical events that were not conceptualized as constitutional by
their actual participants, including, for example, the machinations of
the Athenian prostitute Asparsia in her dalliance with Pericles in Fed-
eralist No. 6.82 In this sense, the simple fact that the discourse we are
listening to does not recognize itself as constitutional is not fatal to our
own constitutional learning.
On the other hand, however, the principle of charity demands that
we do seek charitable constitutional interpretations of other polity's
express articulations of constitutionalism, even if these articulations
would seem to address issues that we ourselves would not initially
regard as "constitutional." Along these lines, the modern idea of a con-
stitution clearly originates in Europe, and most non-European polities,
in using this term, or some recognized translation of this term, are
clearly referencing this initially European concept. Therefore, issues of
translative correspondence are not as ambiguous insofar as the notion
of constitutionalism is concerned as they are for ideas that arise inde-
pendently among various cultures.83 The interpretative question then
becomes one of what Wittgenstein famously termed "family resem-
different value preferences; it could be that it stems from simple miscommunication or ad homi-
nem biases.
81. 1 thank Donald Clarke for compelling me to pay attention to this argument.
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ernest O'Dell ed., 2010).
83. For example, the Chinese word for constitution, "xianfa" was invented precisely to refer-




blances."84 In other words, it becomes why does a particular culture
associate the particular things they do with the collectivity of historical
understandings and experiences that are meaningfully referenced by
the term "constitutional"? This is the question that is most consistent
with the particular concerns of the principle of charity. It invites us to
continually explore the possibility that our understanding of the di-
verse possibilities of constitutionalism is not and will never be com-
plete. It is the epistemic parallel to Robert Kennedy's famous
exhortation (which he misquoted from George Bernard Shaw), not to
"see things as they are and say why?" but to "dream things that never
were and say, why not?"85
III. A DEMONSTRATION: LISTENING TO THE DEBATE OVER THE DRAFT OF THE
PROPERTY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (CA. 2005-2007)
To better demonstrate how constitutional listening works, and
what it might have to show us, we will use it to examine the public de-
bate that was triggered by the drafting of the Property Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China in 2005-2007. This debate is interesting for a
number of reasons. First, it occurred within an environment which is
not normally associated with constitutionalism, that of mainland, or
Communist, China. Mainland China is most commonly portrayed as a
political system in which the normal attributes of constitutional-
ism--such as judicial review, judicial protection of human rights, rule
of law, multi-party election to national office-are decidedly absent.
Second, the critique that triggered this debate has been largely ig-
nored, if not dismissed, outside of China, particularly in its more af-
firmatively "Marxist" aspects. But in fact, as we shall see, embedded in
that critique are very important reminders about what the human pro-
ject of constitutionalism entails, in both its positive and its negative
aspects.
84. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31e-36e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d
ed. 1986).
85. See Robert F. Kennedy, Remarks of Robert F. Kennedy at the University of Kansas (Mar.
18, 1968), transcription available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/RFK-
Speeches/Remarks-of-Robert-F-Kennedy-at-the-University-of-Kansas-March-18-1968.aspx;
GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, BACK TO METHUSELAH: A METABIOLOGICAL PENTATEUCH 6 (rev. ed., 1945)
(George Bernard Shaw's actual quote reads, "You see things; and you say 'Why?' But I dream
things that never were; and I say, 'Why not?').
138 [Vol 88:1
CONSTITUTIONAL LISTENING
A. Overview of the Debate (I): Constitutional Development in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China
Traditional constitutional analyses are somewhat dismissive of
China's constitutional culture. Consistent with our discussion above,
these analyses invariably focus on identifying particular structural
features that are considered definitive of constitutionalism-namely
judicial review, electoral democracy, juridical protection of civil and
political rights, separation of powers, and rule by law. China's constitu-
tional system is deficient in all these aspects. Neither the courts nor
any other juridical organs have formal authority to decide on constitu-
tionality.86 China is functionally a one-party state in which all signifi-
cant political authority is determined by party dictate operating
outside of any democratic-electoral supervision.87 Fundamental and
legal rights, including civil and political rights, are routinely violated by
public authorities, and indeed, when legal abuses are exposed, it is
perhaps more likely than not that the exposer, rather than the abuser,
suffers the wrath of the state.88 China expressly disavows a constitu-
tional doctrine of separation of powers,89 although in actual fact, this is
consistent with its parliamentary style of government, and in that way
no different from England or Australia. China's legal institutions and
legal professionalism are still vestigial: China's performance on rule of
law indexes, while comparable to that of other countries with similar
GDP per capital levels of income, is still significantly below global aver-
age.90
But one would be wrong to conclude simply from this that the
constitution has no force in China. In fact, quite the opposite is true.
Ever since the re-establishment of a rationalized political order follow-
ing the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, constitutional argument
has consistently shown itself capable of shaping and disciplining politi-
cal behavior, much in the same way we saw it shaping and disciplining
86. QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 174-76 (Peter Leyland
& Andrew Harding eds., 2012).
87. TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS OF CHINA 91-120 (2d ed., 2004).
88. See, e.g., Paul Mooney, "Made in China" Label Spurs Global Concern, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE
MAGAZINE, Aug. 23, 2007, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/
0/%E2%80/9Cmade-
china%E2%80%9D-label-spurs-global-concern.
89. DENG XIAOPING, Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Bourgeois Liberalization, in 3 SELECTED
WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING 130 (People's Daily Online ed., 1994).
90. See Randall P. Peerenboom, Middle Income Blues: The East Asian Model and Implications
for Constitutional Development in China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 77, n.1 (St6phanie
Balme and Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009).
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the political behavior in post-Stalin Poland above.91 Deng Xiaoping,
China's paramount leader following the re-establishment of political
order, had intended to consolidate political authority entirely in the
Party.92 But almost from the beginning of his tenure, selected aspects
of political authority began gravitating to the constitutional apparatus.
A key moment in this occurred in the early to middle 1980s when a
senior party member named Peng Zhen successfully deployed consti-
tutional argument within the Party itself to effectively locate some
degree of autonomous political authority in the National People's Con-
gress (NPC).93 Subsequently, the NPC began revising its own interna-
tional operating procedures to give greater voice to a greater diversity
of social interests as a means of reifying, at least somewhat, its unique
constitutional status as China's principal constitutional fount of "dem-
ocratic" legitimacy.94 Internal constitutional discussion and argument
was a constant feature of this internal development.
The 1990s saw the emergence of a more "popular constitutional-
ism." An emerging rural activist movement began using constitutional
argument to challenge local confiscations of land in court.9s As noted
above, technically, courts in China lack authority to interpret constitu-
tional provisions, but there is evidence that these arguments had some
kind of positive effect.96 Particular constitutional tropes of resistance
would diffuse from locale to locale, transferred through networks of
rural activists.97 Throughout the 1990s, these tropes would evolve
from focusing on constitutional prohibitions against predatory confis-
cations to focusing more on constitutional protections of the right to
resist such predations. The twin processes of diffusion and evolution
strongly suggest that this diffusion was being driven at least somewhat
by functionality. Studies by St6phanie Balme of rural grassroots judici-
aries, conducted in the early and middle part of the first decade of the
2000s, found that these judiciaries were in fact being influenced by
91. See Rapaczynski, supra notes 16-19.
92. See Murray Scot Tanner, Organizations and Politics in China's Post-Mao Law-Making
System, in DOMESTIC LAw REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 56, 74-76 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994).
93. Id.
94. See Michael W. Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National
People's Congress, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 22-23 (1997).
95. See, e.g., Yu Jianrong, Dangqian Nongmin Weiquan Huodong de yige Jieshi Kuangjia [A
Framework for Analyzing the Rights Protection Movement of Today's Peasant], 2 SHEHUIXUE YANJIU
49, 49 (2004).
96. See St6phanie Balme, Ordinary justice and Popular Constitutionalism in China, in BUILDING
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 90, 179-80.
97. See Yu, supra note 95, at 51.
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constitutional argument despite the formal prohibitions against consti-
tutional interpretation.98
A defining moment in the growing effectiveness of constitutional
argument in China occurred in 2003 when a recent college graduate,
Sun Zhigang, was found beaten to death under police orders while in
police custody in Guangdong.99 It turned out that Sun was being de-
tained illegally, and this-combined with the new speed of Internet
communication-mobilized widespread public revulsion throughout
China.ioo In addition, there was a serious constitutional problem with
the particular system in which he had been detained: the infamous
custody and repatriation system that was used to send rural migrants
in urban centers back to their place of origin in the event they did not
have formal permission to migrate.lol The custody and repatriation
system lacked formal statutory authorization, despite both a legal and
constitutional mandate that required every state action that restrained
personal liberty to be authorized by national statute.1o2 Several consti-
tutional law scholars used the Sun Zhigang affair to formally petition
the National People's Congress to review the constitutionality of that
procedure.1o3 The NPC did not respond to the petition, but almost im-
mediately after the tendering of these petitions, which were reported
in the state-run press, the State Council (China's executive branch)
voluntarily revoked the custody and repatriation system.104
Although the State Council's revocation of the custody and repat-
riation system did not formally acknowledge its constitutional infirmi-
ties, the social meaning that attached to that act of revocation was that
it had in fact been revoked due in significant part to its constitutional
infirmities.10s Following this incident, private constitutional petitions
to the NPC of the kind that preceded the revocation of the custody and
repatriation system became somewhat commonplace.1o6 Some of these
were reported in the press, and the reports occasionally provoked re-
98. See, e.g., Balme, supra note 96, at 180.
99. See generally Keith Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and
Constitutional Review Proposals in the People's Republic of China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
CHINA,supra note 90, 222-23.
100. Id. at 223-24.
101. See Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou
System, 137 CHINA Q. 644, 667-68 (1994). See also Fei-Ling Wang, Reformed Migration Control and
New Targeted People: China's Hukou System in the 2000s, 177 CHINA Q. 115, 117 (2004).
102. Hand,supra note 99, at 224-26.
103. Id. at 224-30.
104. Id. at 225-26.
105. Id. at 230-32.
106. Id. at 232-39.
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form when they generated significant popular support and re-
sponse.107 Rarely, if ever, did these reforms formally acknowledge the
constitutional argument, but again, the social meaning that attached to
these reforms was a clear recognition that constitutionalism count-
ed.108
B. Overview of the Debate (II): The Draft Property Law and the Open
Letter by Gong Xiantian
It was within such an environment that the debates over the NPC's
draft Property Law emerged in late 2005.109 Like the constitutional
argument that accompanied the Sun Zhigang affair, this debate can be
seen as a significant step in China's ongoing trajectory of constitution-
alization.11o The constitutional arguments that emerged out of the Sun
Zhigang affair, while triggering wide-spread attention and reflection,
were legalistic and technocratic in character.111 There is an argument
that legalistic and technocratic presentations of constitutionalism,
even when widely followed, are not particularly effective at promoting
emergent constitutionalization.112 Rather, it is through its ideational
manifestation-particularly its articulation of national identity and the
existential meaning that it imparts to the national polity-that a consti-
tution initially embedded itself and its authority into national con-
sciousness. Such was the case, for example, with the American and
English constitutions.113 Many argue that the failure to constitutional-
ize the European Union in 2005 was the result of the very legalist and
technocratic focus of that particular constitutional project.114
Along these lines, and in contrast to the argument accompanying
the Sun Zhigang affair, the constitutional arguments that drove the
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Dowdle, supra note 44, at 216 (further discussing trajectory of debates concerning
Property Law draft).
110. Id. at 217.
111. Hand, supra note 99, at 228-30.
112. See, e.g., Eva Pils, Rights Activism in China: The Case of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng, in BUILDING
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 90, 243.
113. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE (1986) (on America); JAMES A. EPSTEIN, RADICAL ExPRESSION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE, RITUAL,
AND SYMBOL IN ENGLAND, 1790-1850 at 29-69 (1994) (on England); Dror Wahrman, Public Opinion,
Violence and the Limits of Constitutional Politics, in RE-READING THE CONSTITUTION: NEW NARRATIVES
IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND'S LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 83, 83-122 (James Vernon ed.,
1996) (on England).
114. See, e.g., Michael A. Wilkinson, Civil Society and the Re-imagination of European Constitu-
tionalism, 9 EUR. L.J. 451,451-53 (2003).
142 [Vol 88:1
CONSTITUTIONAL LISTENING
national public debate over the draft property law were much more
ideational and existential in focus.
The Property Law sought to rationalize the legal system governing
the nature of land ownership. The transition from a state-owned to a
state-managed economy had greatly destabilized the legal institutions
of property in China, particularly real property.115 Private markets for
land and other forms of property emerged that operated alongside
continuing administrative-bureaucratic patterns of state ownership
and control.116 Local officials could arbitrage between these two forms
of property institutions, confiscating land or assets from local residents
or local state-owned firms at very little cost via administrative pro-
cesses, as per their authority under the state's bureaucratic property
regime, and then selling it to private owners at much higher private
market rates.117 This resulted in windfall returns to the confiscating
officials, returns that may or may not go into the public fund. Confisca-
tions also generated great social disruption to the large populations of
local residents and local workers who had been summarily displaced
from their communities and livelihoods through such confiscations.118
In January of 2002, the NPC began work on a draft property law
that was intended to fix this problem.119 It sought to do this in signifi-
cant part by normalizing and prioritizing the marketization of state-
held land and assets.120 A more comprehensive marketization of both
state-held land and other forms of state-held assets would decrease
opportunity for administrative seizure, thus reducing opportunity to
realize windfalls returns by reselling through private markets, and
thus restore some degree of security and fairness in both for employ-
ees of state-run firms and especially for residents of rural communi-
ties121
Particularly to constitutional and legal scholars trained in Euro-
American law, there was no question that the draft Property Law rep-
resented a significant advance in China's legal and economic develop-
115. Xiaolin Guo, Land Expropriation and Rural Conflicts in China, 188 CHINA Q. 422, 438-39
(2001).
116. Id. at 424-25.
117. Id. at 431.
118. Id. at 431-33.
119. Matthew S. Erie, China's (Post-) Socialist Property Rights Regime: Assessing the Impact of
the Property Law on Illegal Land Takings, 37 HONG KONG L.J. 919,933 (2007).




ment.122 In China, however, the draft provoked an unexpected fire-
storm of constitutional discussion.123 In July of 2005, the NPC posted
the draft Property Law on its public website for public comment. A
month later, a professor of Marxist Jurisprudence on the Beijing Uni-
versity Law faculty named Gong Xiantian posted online a scornful cri-
tique of that draft in the form of an open letter to the NPC entitled, "A
Property Law (Draft) that violates the constitution and the basic prin-
ciples of socialism."124 A print account of that open letter was subse-
quently published in the newspaper Southern Weekend (Nanfang
Zhoumo) on February 23, 2006.125
As implicated above, Gong's constitutional critique was not di-
rected towards a particular provision in the law, it was directed to-
wards the spirit of that law, and how it implicates the meaning of
China's constitution.126 He writes:
The absolute majority of the clauses (their essence) and the concrete
principles of the Draft are correct and good... A difference must be
drawn between the experts (jurists) and politicians; the work of the
actual law drafters should be given recognition, and their labour re-
spected, but their professional limitations exist. It's different in the
case of politicians, leading officials and power institutions, as they
should have a political i.e., a bird's eye perspective and a concept of
the totality... [It is] [t]he fundamental principle and spirit of the en-
tire law [that] I oppose ... [N]inety-eight per cent of its clauses ...
are correct and scientifically based.127
Gong's principal complaint with the draft law was that it effective-
ly prioritized the development of the private economy over the public
economy, which was contrary to China's constitutional status as a dis-
tinctly socialist polity.128 Article 12 of the PRC Constitution states that
"socialist public property is sacred and inviolable." This, according to
Gong, is not simply a product of constitutional language, but a funda-
122. Typical is Huen Wong & Adam Arkel, China's New Property Law: Practical Issues, ASIALAW,
May 2007, http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1971055/Search/Results/Chinas-New-Property-
Law-Practical-issues.html (noting that "The PRC Property Law... is widely hailed as a significant
step forward in China's legal and economic development.").
123. See Joseph Kahn, A Sharp Debate Erupts in China Over Ideologies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2006, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/asia/12china.html?-r=0.
124. Gong, supra note 1.
125. Zhao Lei, Beijinq Professor Open Letter on the Property Law Violatinq the Constitution,
Restarts Controversy between what is Socialist and what is Capitalist, SOUTHERN WEEKEND [NANFANG
ZHoUMo], Feb. 23,2006, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-02-23/1501.9183436.shtmL.





mental component of China's constitutional history and character.129
The draft law focuses exclusively on privatization and marketization,
without recognizing at all the contrary needs of the socialist property
system.130 In so doing, they deny the distinctly socialist essence of
modern China and its constitutional history:
The most critical and core clauses of the Draft are wrong! Not only
have they not protected public property rights (communal property
under socialism and state property), which are the legislative ex-
pression of the socialist public ownership system that forms the ma-
terial prerequisites and economic foundation of citizens' equal rights
in our country. Even worse, under the impact of the prevailing pri-
vatization current of thought in our country, in reality, the economic
sectors based on the public property system are no longer the main
game, and the leading position of the state economy has been seri-
ously impaired.131
Gong recognizes the ambiguities that have resulted from China's
transition to a more capitalist economy, and the severe social disrup-
tions and hardships they have caused, but he argues that the proper
constitutional response to this very real problem is not to abandon the
public-property system and embed the new capitalist system.132 The
problems and injustices that China's transitional property system is
currently generating-economic insecurity for farmers and workers,
private appropriation of public goods-are precisely those that the
socialist property system was designed to address.133 As a distinctly
socialist country, China should therefore address these injustices by
strengthening that socialist property system, not by functionally aban-
doning it:
To the labouring masses and all Chinese citizens, the public owner-
ship system and state property provide the most important and fun-
damental protection to and are also the material expression of the
property right of each of them. In the absence of the property right
of the state and the collective, the property right of individual citi-
zens has no chance of being realised.... It's hard to imagine what
would happen if this stipulation were gone!134
It is privatization of property, not its remaining socialist owner-










Since the reform and opening policy started especially under the in-
fluence in recent years of neo-liberal economics of the West and the
"Washington consensus" a small minority in China, who seek to
promote capitalism and to bring down the state enterprises on
which the economy of New China has been based ... In name, they
are seeking to steer the state enterprises to health, but in reality,
they are steering them to death, selling them at deflated prices. (Re-
member what Premier Zhu Rongji once said: "In what way is it a
sale? It's a giveaway, a half-sale, half-giveaway.") These moves have
resulted in a massive leakage of the assets of state enterprises, forc-
ing redundancy on many workers, resulting in the serious economic
and social problems that prevail today, bringing great difficulties to
the work of the party central leadership as well as the government,
locking all players on the chessboard into a state where taking initia-
tives is difficult.135
In sum, he concludes,
We have to cultivate from scratch the legal civilization of socialism,
and not follow in the footsteps of the legal civilization of capital-
ism! ... To move along the grand path of legal civilization opened up
by socialist countries so far is our only way forward! We should
learn from and assimilate the achievements from all past civiliza-
tions, but we absolutely mustn't blindly imitate and slavishly copy
the civil code of the bourgeoisie. We must create a socialist legal civi-
lisation that carries our national characteristics! Otherwise, we can
only draw up a civil code that steers the wheel of history backwards,
not one that we can ever be proud of, but, rather, one that will bring
shame to China's legal civilization!136
In both its arguments and its larger concerns, Gong's complaint
resonates with an emerging intellectual tradition in China which is
probably best known among Anglo-Europeans as the "New Left," but
which are probably better referred to as the "critical left."137 What
defines this critical left is a desire to re-invigorate the concerns and
discourses of China's socialist history and identify as a necessary coun-
ter-weight-or 'countermovement', to use Polanyi's famous image-
ry-to China's rabid socio-economic traverse into neo-liberal
marketization,138 and this is clearly what drives Gong's complaint as
well. The emergence of this new, critical left tradition has alarmed
many working out of the more classically "liberal" tradition character-
istic of Anglo-American political, legal and constitutional thought, not
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See generally Pankaj Mishra, China's New Leftist, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 15, 2006, at 48
(Magazine), www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/151eftist.html.
138. See also Xu Jilin, Liu Qing, Luo Gang & Xue Yi, In Search of a "Third Way": A Conversation
Regarding "Liberalism" and the "New Left Wing", in VOICING CONCERNS: CONTEMPORARY CHINESE
CRITICAL INQUIRY 199, 201 (Gloria Davies ed., 2001).
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simply because of its embrace of a Marxism in which it is the state ra-
ther than the market or civil society that does the heavy lifting in
providing economic justice, but perhaps even more critically because
of its embrace of a distinctly Chinese Marxism as revealed in part, albe-
it very imperfectly, in China's early Maoist period.139 Mao Zedong, and
by association "Maoism," is a heavily reviled figure among a large seg-
ment of people who view China from an Anglo-American or otherwise
liberal constitutional perspective.140 To persons of such persuasion, an
intellectual movement that finds even the smallest glimmer of inspira-
tion from anything associated with Mao or Maoism can only be morally
pernicious.
Consistent with its more general treatment of China's critical left
tradition, the liberal, Anglo-American constitutional tradition has been
largely dismissive of Gong's critique. His honest concern for the plight
of the peasant and working classes has been widely recognized, but his
distinctly socialist prescriptions, and in particular his embrace of the
socialist public-property system, have been dismissed out of hand.141
No scholar from this tradition appears to have considered his argu-
ments seriously.
But if Gong's complaint has not received a considered reception
from people looking at China from the liberal tradition, it did provoke
enormous reflection from within China's own popular-constitutional
consciousness. It delayed the passage of the draft Property Law that
had previously been expected to pass without issue.142 As bluntly de-
scribed by the Beijing Review (a national news-magazine sponsored by
the Chinese state):
[Gong's] letter created a huge controversy in society, where large-
scale ideological debates over socialism and capitalism have been
largely unheard of since reform architect Deng Xiaoping called for a
renewed push toward a market-oriented economy during his visit to
southern China in early 1992.
While Gong was attacked by legal experts, especially the drafters of
the laws, for delaying an essential part of a prospective civil code,
Gong was widely supported by tens of thousands of Internet users,
who worried about the widening income gap in society and about
139. See Vukovich, supra note 41, at 47-65.
140. See, e.g., Link, supra note 41, at 22.
141. See Erie, supra note 121, at 936-40.
142. Li Li, Setting a Precedent: China's legislature is increasingly considering public opinion in




fraud and corruption in some people's headlong pursuit of private
wealth.
This group posted items on online forums to support Gong and even
praised him as a national hero. Gong's concerns have also been ech-
oed by a handful of sociologists who suspect the country's first law
to protect private ownership could undermine the legal foundation
of China's socialist system.
The vocal war between the two camps of scholars and citizens,
which sometimes evolved into a debate over who was trying to make
the drafting process a political issue, immediately attracted the at-
tention of China's legislature.143
Eventually, the state tried to reign in the popular constitutional
discourse Gong's letter had provoked.144 However, the discourse flared
up again in June of 2008, when the Supreme People's Court solicited
public comment on its own draft rules on implementing that piece of
legislation which had been passed by the NPC in March of 2007.145
Given the limits of our own current understanding of the possibili-
ties and limits of the human project of constitutionalism, it is probably
not wise to reflexively dismiss as intellectually meaningless arguments
that have provoked such unprecedented reflection within a polity that
has both historically and recently shown considerable, if somewhat
unrecognized, sophistication in its collective constitutional discourse
and imagination. It is precisely in those places that we have yet to seri-
ously explore where truly new knowledge and understanding is most
likely to be found. This is as true for comparative constitutionalism as
it is for anything else. Gong's critique, and the reflection it provoked,
would thus seem a promising site for identifying new insights into con-
stitutionalism, and thus a prime candidate for what we are calling
"constitutional listening."
C. Listening to Gong: Possible Lessons for our Understanding of Consti-
tutionalism
Perhaps what strikes one most directly about Gong's critique is its
ideology, particularly for a listener coming from the Anglo-American
constitutional perspective. Gong's critique is clearly informed by an
ideological commitment to China's Marxist-Socialist heritage. Gong's
Marxist-Socialist ideology is one of the reasons why comparativists
143. Id
144. See Eva Pils, Waste No Land: Property, Dignity and Growth in Urbanizing China, 11 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 1, 28 (2009-2010).
145. Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction: Exploring for Constitutionalism in
21t Century China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 90, at 8.
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working out of the American tradition have given little respect to
Gong's critique. The American vision of constitutionalism, in particular,
was historically linked to Smithian economics. Even beyond this,
Americans have historically been ideologically hostile to both Marxist
and socialist worldviews.
Along these lines, scholars working out of American and Anglo-
phone political, economic and legal traditions tend to dismiss Gong's
defense of the public ownership system as simply economically un-
founded.146 Public ownership, they note, does not and did not promote
economic growth in China.147 But of course, economic growth is not
the only possible function of an economic system. Prior to the advent
of growth-based economics in the eighteenth century, the principal
purpose of an economic system in Europe was widely seen to lie in
providing security and stability to the population.148 Indeed, a growing
number of Anglo-European economists are again coming to question
the present-day obsession with growth found within contemporary
economiCs.149
And for whatever reason, the Chinese themselves are much less
convinced that the public ownership system was the failure that it is
often portrayed to be outside of China.1so Surveys of Chinese farmers
conducted in the 1990s found that these farmers tended to like the
public ownership system when it was administered fairly.15 Growing
nostalgia among the Chinese themselves for the earlier Maoist period
of the 1950s and early 1960s further belie the claim that China's public
ownership system was a pure and utter failure.152
146. See, e.g., Janet C. Sturgeon & Thomas Sikor, Post-socialist Property in Asia and Europe:
Variations on 'Fuzziness, 1 CONSERVATION & Soc'Y. 2 (2004). Cf Vukovich, supra note 41.
147. Sturgeon, supra note 146, at 2.
148. GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE WORLD 20-25
(2007). Cf KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME 57-58 (2001).
149. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE
MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 8-9 (2009). See also ROBERT M.
COLLINS, MORE: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN POSTWAR AMERICA 234 (2000).
150. Roy Prosterman, Brian Schwarzwalder & Ye Jianping, Implementation of 30-Year Land
Use Rights for Farmers Under China's 1998 Land Management Law: An Analysis and Recommenda-
tions Based on a 17 Province Survey, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 1. 507, 521-22 (2000).
151. Id.
152. Guobin Yang, China's Zhiqing Generation: Nostalgia, Identity, and Cultural Resistance in
the 1990s, 29 MODERN CHINA 267, 268 (2003). See also CHING KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR
PROTESTS IN CHINA's RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT 140-46 (2007).
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Gong's defense of the public ownership system does not lie pri-
marily in a claim of some objective economic superiority.153 Rather, he
locates it in an allegiance to China's own national history:
We have to cultivate from scratch the legal civilization of socialism,
and not follow in the footsteps of the legal civilization of capitalism!
In the twenty-first century, it is not possible for us to create as our
ancestors did with the Tang Law a legal code encapsulating the legal
civilization of feudal society nor is it possible to create something
like the Napoleonic Code a legal code encapsulating the legal civiliza-
tion of capitalism as the French bourgeoisie did. To move along the
grand path of legal civilization opened up by socialist countries so
far is our only way forward! We should learn from and assimilate the
achievements from all past civilizations, but we absolutely mustn't
blindly imitate and slavishly copy the civil code of the bourgeoisie.
We must create a socialist legal civilization that carries our national
characteristics! Otherwise, we can only draw up a civil code that
steers the wheel of history backwards, not one that we can ever be
proud of, but, rather, one that will bring shame to China's legal civili-
zation!154
One suspects that it is really this nationalist tone that provokes
the perfunctory intellectual dismissiveness of comparativists working
out of the Anglo-American tradition. That tradition deeply distrusts
nationalism for at least two reasons. First, since the end of the Second
World War, that tradition has increasingly settled on the American
model of constitutionalism as a global standard for comparative refer-
ence. In a world in which there is only one model of constitutionalism,
an appeal to any national distinction becomes constitutionally irrele-
vant. Second, the American constitutional model is couched in a meta-
phor of scientific positivism. It is a mechanistic metaphor which thinks
in terms of a tangible thing called power that can be channeled and
opposed against other power, and otherwise behaves in very predicta-
ble ways, as governed by a universal political psychology of power
maximization.155 Scientific positivism is an innately universalist epis-
temology. Being scientific, the mechanistic principles that govern the
behavior of political power and political will are not particular to any
particular nation, and thus transcend the national identities that are
the focus of nationalism.
And if Anglo-European constitutional comparativists are skeptical
of nationalism to begin with, they are likely to be especially skeptical of
Chinese nationalism. Modern Chinese nationalism tends to celebrate
153. Gong, supra note 1.
154. Id.
155. See generally Winter, supra note 3.
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aspects of China's society and political history that are inconsistent
with the liberal vision of government that informs American constitu-
tionalism in particular.156 We have already noted this somewhat in
Gong's defense of public ownership. For the most part though, liberal-
ism has not played a significant role in modern China's political history
or experiences.157 There is little raw material from which one could
construct a liberal vision of Chinese national identity. Instead, that
history is defined by backwardness, perceived international subjuga-
tion, revolution, factionalism and more perceived foreign subjugation,
more revolution, and finally modernization within the context of some-
thing called the "people's democratic dictatorship."isa Liberalism finds
little purchase in such a national history.
For these reasons, comparative constitutionalists tend to demand
that in order to be viable, Chinese constitutionalism (in particular) has
to escape its Chinese past. Gong's critique, and China's larger critical
left tradition of which the critique is a part, does not escape this past.
Consequently, it is invariably dismissed as constitutionally irrelevant,
if not constitutionally dangerous.159 But is it really possible? At its
heart, a constitutionalism must both identify and distinguish its polity.
It must distinguish who it covers from whom it does not, and justify its
special claim to govern that polity as opposed to other possible alter-
natives. This is not a normative observation, it is a sociological one: a
constitution that cannot establish a basis for its own authority as supe-
rior law will not have the persistence of superior law, it will not be long
for this world.
Thus, particularly in its earlier stages of emergence and social en-
trenchment, constitutionalism is an innately nationalist endeavor.160
This was as true for the United States as it was generally in other na-
tions. During its revolutionary days, American constitutional con-
156. See Jean-Pierre Cabestan, The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism, 59 CHINA PERSP. 1, 2-3
(May-June 2005).
157. Julia Tao, The Chinese Moral Ethos and the Concept of Individual Rights, 7 J. OF APPLIED
PHIL. 119,119 (1990).
158. See generally WANG Hui, CHINA'S NEW ORDER: SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMY IN TRANSITION
46-77 (Theodore Huters ed., 2003); Gan Yang, Debating Liberalism and Democracy in China in the
1990s, in WHITHER CHINA: INTELLECTUAL POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 79, 79-101 (Xudong Zhang
ed., 2001). See also Zhu Suli, "udicial Politics" as State-Building, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
CHINA, supra note 90, 23-35. Cf Xiaohong Xiao-Planes, Of Constitutions and Constitutionalism:
Trying to Build a New Political Order in China, 1908-1949, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA,
supra note 90, 37-57.
159. See, e.g., Perry Link, supra note 41, at 22. See generally Vukovich, supra note 41.
160. Alexander Somek, The Owl of Minerva: Constitutional Discourse Before its Conclusion, 71
MOD. L. REv. 473, 487-89 (2008).
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sciousness was founded critically on the Enlightenment vision of
America as enjoying a unique proximity to the original state of nature,
and thus representing or reifying the most perfect example of political
liberty known to man.161 As described by Michael Kammen, for the
first several generations of Americans, the social meaning that at-
tached to the American constitution lay precisely in its distinctive con-
tribution to American national identity, not in the details of its text and
not in the technocratic genius of its particular institutional designs,
which had been rendered somewhat moot by the invention of Jack-
sonian democracy and the mass-based political party.162 It was not
really until the 1870s that the present-day vision of the American con-
stitution as an objective project of political engineering began to pre-
dominate in American constitutional discourse. Similarly, Dicey's
identification of English constitutionalism was critically founded on a
desire to distinguish and celebrate England's constitutional identity
vis-A-vis those of the European continent, most notably the French.163
This is especially likely to be the case with regard to the younger
and less developed or established nations of the Global South. Past
experiences with colonialism, present experiences with globalization,
and now increasingly global prescriptions for modernization and gov-
ernance (with the paradigm for both being the United States) can give
rise to real questions about what a national constitution actually
means, why it is any different from, but less superior to, any other pos-
sible source of authority-be it sub-national, regional, or global.
And in identifying a political identity, history provides the best
source material for constitutionalism. It is history that distinguishes
the collective "people" of one particular terrain from those of another.
It is through reflection on that history from which the seemingly dis-
tinctive collection of values and concerns that identify and distinguish
one nation from another are derived. By emphasizing these distinctive
values and concerns, a constitution can identify itself as uniquely sym-
biotic with that polity. And as noted above, it is not necessary for the
historical tropes upon which a constitutionalism is founded to actually
be accurate as a matter of objective history.164 English constitutional-
161. See Gaysupra note 26, at 563-68.
162. KAMMEN, supra note 113, 68-94. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 304-05, 347-70 (1991) (discussing American constitution being rendered moot by
Jacksonian Democracy).
163. See A.V. [ALBERT VENN] DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
183-205, 369-73 (10th ed., 1961).
164. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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ism, for example, was critically founded upon a particular historical
trope-that of the "Norman Yoke"-that was demonstrably false.165
More recently, John Braithwaite and others have found how demon-
strable and knowingly false historical tropes of very recent historical
events are. In this case, localized events of sectarian violence that raced
through Indonesia in the late 1990s and the early part of the first dec-
ade of the twenty-first century have played a critical role in reestab-
lishing shared local identities, and resultant peace, among previously
warring local factions.166
The point of all this is that China is unlikely to found a constitu-
tionalism on a rejection of its past, in the way presumed by persons
working out of the Anglo-European, and particularly the American,
constitutional tradition. As demonstrated in China in 1912, 1949 and
the late 1960s,167 and in France in the 1790S,168 such a rejection, even
if motivated by liberal ideals, is likely to simply reproduce a new, but
still illiberal political hegemony as opposed to a new constitutionalism.
By contrast, what Bruce Ackerman calls liberal revolutions169-such as
occurred in the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe in 1989, or in
Taiwan, Mexico, Indonesia and yes, even South Africa, in the 1990s-
are invariably constructed on top of constitutional structures, but insti-
tutional and ideological revolutions were paradoxically inherited from
the pre-liberal ancien rigime.170
In this sense, Gong's critique could well be very indicative of Chi-
na's constitutional future. China's commitment to such a future is likely
to be framed in terms of an accompanying commitment to its socialist
past. For better or worse, this is China's most visibly distinct history.
As such, it cannot be abandoned or denied without abandoning consti-
tutionalism itself.
As previously noted, it is precisely in constitutionalism's embrace
of history that it is able to transcend that history. The flaws of that ac-
tual experience are not obstacles to its capacity to serve as a founda-
165. See Vann, supra note 34, at 263-64.
166. See Braithwaite, supra note 35.
167. See Xiao-Planes, supra note 158, at 37-57; Suli, supra note 158, at 23-35. Cf Qian Liqun,
Refusing to Forget, in ONE CHINA, MANY PATHS 292, 293-95 (Chaohua Wang ed., 2003).
168. See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 674-75 (1989).
169. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 2-3 (1992).
170. See Mattei Dogan & John Higley, Elites, Crises, and Regimes in Comparative Analysis, in
ELITES, CRISES, AND THE ORIGINS OF REGIMES 3, 20-23 (Mattei Dogan & John Higley eds., 1998); Abdo
1. Baaklini, Viable Constitutionalism and Democratic Political Stability, in DESIGNS FOR DEMOCRATIC




tion for constructing a new constitutionalism. The seeds for future
constitutional emergence and development and the ideals and values it
is used to reference are found in the social meaning of that experience
and not in its factual history per se. In this light, the ideals and values
that Gong attaches to China's distinctly socialist experiences seem ad-
mirable, even from a liberal perspective.171 These include a desire for
economic equality, recognition of the state's duty to provide for the
alienated and needy, and the value of providing the citizenry a safe and
stable economic and social life.172 Moreover, these are not just Polly-
annaish recitations of China's political elite: they are articulated pre-
cisely in the context of criticizing this elite.173
People may question the capacity of a "socialist public economy"
to deliver on these values, but at the end of the day, economic systems
and property systems are simply social constructs. The common law
system of private property so celebrated by neo-liberal economics was
actually, up until the nineteenth century, formally crafted as a feudal
property system in which the English King owned all land.174 Techni-
cally, no one in England "owned" land under the traditional common
law of property, they simply enjoyed secure usage rights that had been
indirectly granted to them in perpetuity by its true owner, the King;175
hence, the complexity of the common law of property. Interestingly,
urban land in China and in Hong Kong has been marketized using a
similar fiction: land is actually owned by the State who grants usage
rights vesting in individuals sufficient to allow for marketized forms of
transfer and redistribution.176
There is nothing fixed in the potential institutional shape of a "so-
cialist public ownership" system for land or other forms of property.
What is somewhat more fixed are the particular social and political
values that the term invokes. In this sense, Gong's critique is a uniquely
public call to China's constitutional animus to respect these values in
constructing China's property regime even in the face of the more fa-
miliar values of growth and market efficiency pressed by other, pres-
ently more intellectually prominent, conceptions of property. There is
171. Gong, supra note 1.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 230 (4th ed., 2002).
175. Id.
176. See Donald Clarke, China's Stealth Urban Land Revolution 4-8, 24-28 (unpublished manu-




now some significant dissatisfaction, even in the North Atlantic, with
the degree to which property is privatized in the American constitu-
tional system, and in the corresponding degree to which that economic
system privileges economic growth and efficiency over competing so-
cial values.177 It is not beyond the pale to suspect that China's unique
history might possibly place it in a superior long-term trajectory
through which, at sometime in the future, it is able to develop a prop-
erty system that better acknowledges and addresses these alternative
concerns.178
At the end of the day, a "listening" to Gong's critique reminds us to
be open to such a possibility, and to occasionally look at what China
might be doing constitutionally through such a lens. Note that I am not
arguing here for the existence of some Beijing Consensus, or some
"East Asian Model" of development.179 I am not saying that China is
anywhere close to realizing such a system. What I am suggesting, how-
ever, is that China's remembrance of its constitutional history could
well make it, as a polity, particularly sensitive to these alternative con-
cerns. And as that polity's constitutional imagination develops, and
increasingly frees itself of its hyper-modernist insecurities, it may fa-
vor over the long dur6e evolutionary trajectories of constitutionalism
that lead in this particular direction.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL LISTENING AS MORAL HUMILITY
In the end, I suspect that the principal objection to constitutional
listening, at least when applied to many Asian countries, will be be-
yond the reach of our discussions above. That is, the real reason we do
not want to listen to the constitutional discourse and interpretations of
other constitutional systems is because many of these systems ema-
nate from extreme authoritarian perspectives and we worry that such
listening will threaten to legitimize these perspectives and the authori-
tarian regimes from which these perspectives have emerged.
However, the real world is much more complex than this objection
presumes. While our tendency to classify people and the institutions
177. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR
AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 220 (2006).
178. See, e.g., Zhiyuan Cui, Is it Possible to Establish "A Socialist Market Economy" in China?,
available at http://ppu.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/cui-presentation-may08.pdf (last visited Apr.
25, 2012); Zhiyuan Cui, Whither China? The Discourse on Property Rights in the Chinese Reform
Context, 55 SOCIAL TEXT 67, 68-69 (1998).
179. But see RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE
REST? 26-82 (2007) (discussing a purported "East Asian Model" for development).
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they produce as being either good or evil, legitimate or illegitimate,
may be psychologically comforting (at least insofar as we tend invaria-
bly to classify ourselves as members of the former rather than the lat-
ter), it is not really that informative. Nothing is purely good; nothing is
purely evil. By extension, nothing is purely legitimate, and most im-
portantly, nothing is purely illegitimate.
As noted above, constitutional listening is ultimately about learn-
ing. The claim that we should not listen to odious constitutional sys-
tems simply because they are odious is to effectively assert that we
have already learned all there is to know about what we might call
constitutional morality. I would argue that during the twentieth centu-
ry many of humanity's more egregious political-moral transgressions
have been the product of feelings of moral certainty, more than of
moral uncertainty.
Our best hope for leading moral lives lies in a willingness to look
at even the most odious of humanity and recognize that "there but for
the grace of God go .' Each of us has a capacity for moral error. We
cannot eliminate it; we cannot wish it away by ignoring or pretending
it does not exist.18o To do so is to invite in ourselves that same blind-
ness that led others to become what we so thoroughly condemn.
Constitutional listening-even to the constitutional discourse that
takes place in more odious regimes-is one way that we can prevent
this from happening. At the very least, it can help us better remember
our own ever-present vulnerabilities to moral mistake. In this sense,
we can think of it as a constitutionally moral form of "risk regulation."
Beyond this, its continual demand that we confront and try to make
sense of, rather than ignore and reflexively denigrate, constitutionally
moral practices that seem to conflict with our own could help us occa-
sionally identify some of the moral errors that inevitably infect our
own moral reasoning. In this way, constitutional listening and the em-
pathetic understanding of why an apparently odious constitutional
system looks at the world the way it does is what constitutional listen-
ing seeks to generate, and could paradoxically be the key to preventing
us from replicating the errors of that system.
180. Cf BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 (1981).
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